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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of optimal income taxation when
individuals are assumed to diﬀer with respect to their earnings po-
tential and work preferences. A numerical method for solving this
two-dimensional problem has been developed. We assume an additive
utility function, and utilitarian social objectives. Rather than solve the
ﬁrst order conditions associated with the problem, we directly compute
the best tax function which can be written in terms of a second order
B-spline function. Among our ﬁndings are that marginal tax rates are
higher than one might anticipate, and that very little bunching occurs
at the optimum.
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dimensional population, numerical simulation.
JEL classiﬁcation: C63, H21, H24.
∗We thank Vidar Christiansen, Sören Bo Nielsen, Jukka Pirttilä, seminar participants
at EPRU, Copenhagen Business School, and two anonymous referees for very helpful
comments on an earlier version. We are also grateful to the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation for
ﬁnancial support.
1
1 Introduction
There is a large literature, initiated by Mirrlees (1971), that addresses the
optimal design of nonlinear income taxes. In this literature, the issue of
incentives for supplying labour is tackled directly by modelling individuals
as choosing between work and leisure given the tax-transfer schedule they
face. There are assumed to be a large number of individuals, diﬀering only
in a single parameter, the pre-tax wage they can earn. In other words people
have identical work preferences but face unequal opportunities in the labour
market. The government then chooses a schedule that maximizes a social
welfare function deﬁned on individuals' welfare, that is, on the utility they
derive from their consumption-leisure bundles.
Although the models of the one-dimensional population have been use-
ful for computations and examinations of optimal income tax problem, they
are not in all respects accurate pictures of reality (see Tuomala (1990) for
a survey of this literature). To analyze redistributional policies more fully,
it would be useful to consider situations where individuals are characterized
by more than just one parameter. In the simple model with identical pref-
erences, all workers earning the same level of income also have the same
wage rates (marginal productivities). When preferences vary in unspeciﬁed
ways across individuals, this will not be the case any more. Some people
will be earning a given income because they are more productive, while oth-
ers because they are more hard working. The assumption that diﬀerences in
earnings are completely to be explained by diﬀerences in preferences (working
or leisure preferences) is obviously an unrealistic one, just as the alternative
explanation in terms of ability diﬀerences is also a simpliﬁcation of reality.1
A more realistic model should take into account of both.2
How might these factors including to the optimal income tax model aﬀect
our views as to the optimal level of income taxation and transfer payments?
1There are still other ways to relax the homogeneity assumption. One way is to diﬀer-
entiate the population by easily observable indicators that are correlated with the unob-
servable characteristic of interest. An individual's labour market status or demographic
attributes, for instance, may convey information on underlying ability. The theory of
the optimal use of such information was ﬁrst considered by Akerlof (1978) and developed
further by several authors (for a recent contribution to this tradition see Immonen-Kanbur-
Keen-Tuomala, 1998).
2Although economists typically think of preferences in terms of psychological character-
istics of the individual in question, those characteristics may also have non-psychological
dimensions. Sandmo (1993) noted that there is a parallel here to Sen's discussion of cap-
abilities (see Sen, 1992). Namely there is an important general problem of interpersonal
variations in converting incomes into the actual ability of an individual to do this or be
that. This could be rephrased to refer to the work preferences in our model.
2
Should this, as many seem to believe, be an argument for a more regressive
tax/transfer systems. In fact considerations of that kind can be seen to
lay behind income tax reforms implemented in several countries during last
decades.3 One of our objects is to attempt to answer this question.
This paper builds on a model in which individuals are assumed to dif-
fer in abilities and work preferences. It is clear that the theory of optimal
nonlinear income taxation becomes more complicated since we allow for in-
dividuals to diﬀer in more than one dimension. Papers in this area are few.
Mirrlees (1976, 1986) sets out the framework of a multidimensional optimal
tax problem. He derives ﬁrst order conditions for a tax schedule be optimal.
It is well-known that formal results about the optimal (one-dimensional) in-
come tax are limited. Hence it is not surprising that Mirrlees (1976, 1986)
has no general results concerning the shape of the optimal tax schedule in
the multidimensional case.4
In the context of nonlinear pricing Armstrong (1996) and Wilson (1993)
have analyzed the problem of multidimensional types.5 Armstrong (1996)
shows a class of cases that allow explicit solutions. Wilson (1993) also com-
putes numerical solutions. These contributions are to some extent import-
ant in the context of optimal income taxation. As is typically the case with
nonlinear pricing literature, Armstrong (1996), Rochet-Choné (1998) and
Wilson (1993) exclude income eﬀects. The motivation for ignoring income
eﬀects when constructing nonlinear tariﬀs for services and goods oﬀered to
household customers is that their income elasticities are small and/or their
residual incomes are large in relation to their expenditures on the nonlin-
early priced goods and services. This assumption cannot be easily justiﬁed
in the context of an optimal income taxation model. In particular, in con-
junction with the utilitarian objective it eliminates the equity considerations
that motive the income tax problem in the ﬁrst place. Therefore we face a
more complex problem here.
As is often the case with the one-dimensional optimal income tax model
we have to rely on numerical simulations. In a two-dimensional model this
3It is not obvious that one would want to redistribute income from those who prefer
to work much to those who prefer to work little. Many people, politically on the right,
seemed to believe in that way.
4In Ebert (1988) the problem is considered with some strict restrictions on the utility
function which allows to transform the two-dimensional problem into the one-dimensional
one. Sandmo (1993) (section 6) discusses the diﬃculty to sign marginal tax rate in a linear
income tax model when individuals diﬀer both in tastes and productivities.
5See also Rochet (1985), Laﬀont, Maskin and Rochet (1987) and McAfee and MacMil-
lan (1988). For a recent important contribution to the nonlinear pricing of multidimen-
sional types see Rochet-Choné (1998).
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is even more the case. Moreover now the computation is much demanding.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the formu-
lation of two-dimensional optimal nonlinear income tax problem introduced
by Mirrlees (1976, 1986) and derives necessary conditions for a solution. In
section 3 we adopt a computational approach to the problem and the ap-
pendix presents the basic outlines of our computational method. Section 4
reports a range of numerical calculations. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Mirrlees' formulation
The economy consists of many diﬀerent types of individuals who are dis-
tinguished both by earnings abilities, denoted by t and work (or leisure)
preferences, denoted by s. Thus each individual is characterized by a vector
[t, s]′ of type parameters that varies among individuals. Both characteristics,
t and s, are assumed to be private information that is not available to the
government. The distribution of these type parameters in the population is
given by a density function f such that f(t, s) ≥ 0 on a rectangular domain
Ω = [t0, t1] × [s0, s1]. There are two commodities in an economy, namely a
consumption good x and labour supply y. The economy is competitive so
that pre-tax pay in each job is the workers marginal product in that job.
Hence his gross income z is given by z = t y. The government knows that
when it provides a nonlinear income tax schedule T : R+ → R, where T (z) is
the tax paid on gross income z, each individual maximizes his or her concave
utility function of the following additive form6
u(x, y) = g(x) + s h(y), (1)
subject to
x+ T (z) = z, z = t y (2)
in choosing his or her labour supply. We assume that u ∈ C2, gx > 0 and
hy < 0 for all x, y ≥ 0, y < 1. The higher is the value of s, the stronger is the
preference for leisure or the weaker is the preference for work (or the greater
is the disutility of work). The additivity assumption in (1) has very strong
implications. Namely the marginal utility of consumption is independent of
work preferences.
The labour supply-behaviour can be modelled by ﬁrst-order partial dif-
ferential equations. These are so called incentive compatibility conditions.
6This assumption permits interpersonal comparability.
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Next we introduced formally these conditions. For that we deﬁne the max-
imum value function v : Ω→ R by
v(t, s) = max
x,y
{g(x) + s h(y) : x+ T (z) = z, z = t y}. (3)
For each (t, s) we denote the optimum of (1)(2) by (x(t, s), y(t, s)), and
then we have
v(t, s) = g(x(t, s)) + s h(y(t, s)). (4)
It is assumed that x and y are diﬀerentiable with respect to t and s. Then by
diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to t and s and making use of necessary ﬁrst
order conditions of individual's maximization problem (1)(2) we obtain an
envelope (or incentive compatibility) conditions
vt = −s y hy/t (5)
and
vs = h (6)
for all (t, s) ∈ Ω.
The conditions (5) and (6) are only necessary for the individuals' choices
to be optimal. Suﬃcient conditions for a global maximum are considered in
Mirrlees (1976). We only assume that the conditions (5) and (6) are also
suﬃcient for a global maximum, so that we can substitute the individuals'
utility maximization conditions by the weaker conditions (5) and (6).
Given the tax schedule T , the government can calculate the gross income
z(t, s) and the consumption (net income) x(t, s) for an individual with char-
acteristics (t, s). The problem of the utilitarian government in choosing the
optimal income tax schedule can be described as follows
max
x,y
{W =
∫ ∫
Ω
v(t, s) f(t, s) dt ds} (7)
subject to the revenue constraint∫ ∫
Ω
T (z(t, s)) f(t, s) dt ds =
∫ ∫
Ω
[t y(t, s))− x(t, s)] f(t, s) dt ds = R, (8)
where R is revenue requirement.
But if the government chooses a tax schedule T , the individuals react to
this schedule and modify their labour supply behaviour. These reactions are
presented by the conditions (5), and (6).
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Adding utilities in (7) may face some ethical objections. Namely if indi-
viduals are identical in work preferences, equal marginal utilities of all coin-
cides with equal total utilities. Sen (1973) pointed out that with diversity of
human beings (eg. diﬀerent work preferences in our case) the two can pull
in opposite directions.7 For those who prefer to think of the justiﬁcation
for redistribution as being based on inequality of opportunity, diﬀerences
in preferences may provide a suitable basis for distinguishing economic re-
wards but diﬀerences in abilities in turn do not. This point of view raises
questions on the nature of the parameter s. Namely it may be argued that
both attributes (working preferences and productivity) are circumstances
of birth. Or as Sandmo (1993) pointed out there is a very ﬁne dividing line
between diﬀerences in preferences that are due on the one hand to physiolo-
gical characteristics and on the other hand to psychological attitudes to work.
Therefore, it is far from clear how unsuitable is the utilitarian criterion in our
case. Moreover, it has been the dominant framework in the optimal income
tax literature.
We may eliminate x by inverting (4) so that x(t, s) = Γ(v(t, s), y(t, s), t, s)
for all (t, s) ∈ Ω. Now by choosing y as a control and v as a state function,
we can formulate the problem as an optimal control problem as follows:
max
y,v
{W =
∫ ∫
Ω
v(t, s) f(t, s) dt ds} (9)
subject to the conditions (5), (6) and the revenue constraint∫ ∫
Ω
[t y(t, s))− Γ(v(t, s), y(t, s), t, s)] f(t, s) dt ds = R. (10)
Then we can construct a Lagrangean8 by deﬁning multipliers λ for (10) and
ν(t, s) and α(t, s) for (5) and (6)
L(v, y, λ, ν, α) =
∫ ∫
Ω
{[v(t, s)− λ(Γ(v(t, s), y(t, s), t, s)− t y(t, s))] f(t, s)
+ ν(t, s)[vt + s y hy/t] (11)
+α(t, s)[vs − h]} dt ds
Using Green's formula, taking into account that ν(t0, s) = ν(t1, s) = 0, s ∈
[s0, s1], and α(t, s0) = α(t, s1) = 0, t ∈ [t0, t1] (transversality conditions),
7In fact this led Sen to propose his weak equity axiom which says that redistribution
should be directed to those with lower levels of utility.
8Following Wilson (1993) this formulation can be called as a relaxed version of the
problem in which some of the possibly relevant constraints are omitted. Namely we know
in a one-dimensional model that relatively weak conditions suﬃce to ensure that the
solution the relaxed problem is the solution of the complete problem.
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where t0, s0, t1, s1 are lower and upper bounds for t and s, and setting the
derivatives of L with respect to y and v equal to zero we obtain
T ′(z) = 1 +
s hy
t gx
= −ν(t, s) s[hyy y/t+ hy/t]
λ t f(t, s)
+
α(t, s)hy
λ t f(t, s)
(12)
(1− λ
gx
) f(t, s) = νt + αs (13)
where we have used the facts that Γv gx = 1,Γy = −Γv s hy = −s hy/gx.
The equation (12) is the marginal tax rate formula. To say something about
the properties of the tax schedule we should be able to deduce from (12) and
(13) the sign of multipliers. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Namely, if we
solve y and v from (12) and (13) as a function of λ, α, ν, αs, νt, t and s, substi-
tution in the state equations yields a system of partial diﬀerential equations
for α and ν. This system seems to be rather complicated even to be solved
numerically.9 Therefore we will adopt a direct method to solve this problem
numerically. Wilson (1993,1995) describes various computational methods
and solves some examples of nonlinear pricing without income eﬀects.
It is still a necessary condition for an optimum that the marginal tax rate
faced by the highest income earner should be zero.10 This can be deduced
from (12) and the transversality conditions. Thus, the optimal income tax
schedule must have a zero marginal tax rate at the top, even when the
preference structures underlying the work-behaviour of diﬀerent consumers
diﬀer in any number of ways. The top-income person will now not necessarily
be the one with highest wage rate.11 This result is interesting in the sense
that this property is not purely the result of an assumption that taxpayers
diﬀer only by a scalar parameter. (The additivity assumption in (1) is not
crucial for the result here). Unfortunately these end-point results oﬀer us
little concrete guidance for tax policy purposes.
In sum we can conclude that analytically we have no results concerning
the shape of the optimal schedule. Therefore computer simulation is the only
9In principle, the problem could be solved indirectly using necessary conditions, which
must hold for a solution of the problem, considered in Cesari (1969) and Kazemi-Dehkordi
(1984). However, in practice this turned out to be very diﬃcult even in very simple cases.
10This is the counterpart of a result known as no distortion at the top in nonlinear
pricing theory discussed by Armstrong (1996) and Rochet-Choné (1998).
11This does not aﬀect our conclusions here, even when the preference structures un-
derlying the work-behaviour of diﬀerent individuals diﬀer in any number of ways. An
intuition behind this result is that the only reason to have a marginal tax rate diﬀering
from zero is to raise an average tax rate above that point but at the top is no one to take
from.
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way to gain further insights. In fact the most interesting results obtainable
in the optimal income tax theory are numerical calculations for speciﬁc ex-
amples. It can be said that the very basic nature of income tax problems
requires quantitative results. It is also good to remember that in modern
physics and applied mechanics, where the many partial diﬀerential equations
encountered are almost invariably solved numerically.
3 A computational approach
TarkiainenTuomala (1998) developed a numerical method to solve a two-
dimensional nonlinear income tax problem (the Lagrangean (12)).12 Using
this method we managed to solve the income tax problem only when the
characteristics (t, s) are uniformly distributed. This experience and the com-
plexity of the multidimensional nonlinear income tax problem suggest that
an entirely diﬀerent formulation and computational method might be useful
in practice.
In this section we introduce a new numerical method for solving the op-
timal nonlinear income tax problem with two-dimensional population. The
problem is stated alternatively in terms of taxes. In other words we attempt
to ﬁnd directly the tax function T (z) that maximizes the social welfare func-
tion with constraints. Instead of using the incentive compatibility constraints
(5)(6) we take into account the individual's optimization problem directly.
Now we are looking for T ∗ which solves the following optimization prob-
lem (P):
W (T ∗) = max
T
{W (T ) =
∫ ∫
Ω
[g(z − T (z)) + s h(z/t)] f(t, s) dt ds} (14)
subject to ∫ ∫
Ω
T (z) f(t, s) dt ds = R, (15)
where z(t, s) given T , (denoted by z(T )), is a solution of the following state
12This method is based on the expansion of state and control variables in Lagrange series
and on a spectral collocation method for approximating state equations. In this way, the
optimal control problem can be reduced to a ﬁnite-dimensional nonlinear programming
problem in expansion coeﬃcients. This problem can be solved by using standard nonlinear
programming methods. We used NAG library subroutine E04UCF, which is based on
sequential quadratic programming method, to solve the nonlinear programming problem
(see TarkiainenTuomala, 1998, for a more detailed exposition of this method).
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problem (S):
z(T ) = argmax
z≥0
g(z − T (z)) + s h(z/t) for all (t, s) ∈ Ω.13 (16)
In order to solve the problem (14)(15) we need the values of state mapping
T → z(T ) and thus at each evaluation of z we have to solve the state system
(16). The state constraint z ≥ 0 causes the mapping T → z(T ) to be
nonsmooth.
In order to solve the problem (14)(16) in practice some numerical
method have to be used. The idea is to expand the tax function in terms
of second order B-spline functions. In this way, the problem is replaced by
a nonsmooth parameter optimization problem, that can be solved e.g. by a
Broximal Bundle method. We shall describe brieﬂy a numerical method for
solving the optimal income tax problem (P) in the appendix.
4 Numerical results
This section reports numerical results in a Cobb-Douglas case. It means that
computations were carried out for the Cobb-Douglas utility function
u = ln x+ s ln(1− y) (17)
the time endowment being normalized at unity.
The elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption is 1. So-
cial welfare is taken to be the simple sum of utilities cardinalised as in (17).
The revenue requirement, R, is set at zero so that the sole purpose of tax-
ation is redistributive. It is natural to make comparisons between the one-
dimensional case and the two-dimensional case. The solutions obtained are
displayed in Figures 1, 2 and 3. In Figure 1 we assumed that the character-
istics are uniformly distributed. The domain Ω = [0.03,1.0]×[0.03,1.0]. In
Figures 2 and 3 we in turn assumed that the characteristics (t, s) are dis-
tributed in the population according to a bivariate lognormal distribution
with parameters (µ, σ, ρ) representing the means, variances and correlation
of the characteristic parameters (t, s) in the population. The distributional
coeﬃcient are therefore the ﬁve parameters (µt, µs, σt, σs, ρ). In Figures 2
and 3 we have the following cases (µt = µs = −1, σt = σs = 0.5, ρ = −0.3
and ρ = 0.3) and (µt = −1, µs = −1.2, σt = 0.5, σs = 0.3, ρ = −0.3). The
13In other words the incentive compatibility constraint is now written as the selected
income supply, z(t, s), maximizes utility, given the tax function.
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domain Ω = [0.05,1.4]×[0.05,1.4]. In the one-dimensional case µt = −1 and
σt = 0.5.
There are several features of numerical results that we would like to
emphasize. First, in the two-dimensional cases the marginal tax rates are
not monotone functions of gross income. Secondly, in terms of levels of
marginal tax rate there is a substantial diﬀerence between the one- and two-
dimensional cases. We found that optimal marginal tax rates are higher
for almost all income levels in the two-dimensional case compared to those
obtained from one-dimensional model. In fact we have two possibilities in
the case of one-dimensional population.
Namely if people have identical preferences but diﬀer in abilities, we are
back in the Mirrlees model. The opposite case of the Mirrlees model is that
one in which diversity of preferences is the sole source of inequality. Thus
we consider an economy in which everyone has exactly the same level of
productivity. In Figure 1 we also show the marginal tax rate in this case.
We assume that everyone has a wage rate of 1 i.e. t=1. They turn out
to be nondecreasing over the majority of the population. Thus there is
redistributive taxation in this case. Some people would, however, say that if
individuals have the same opportunities, then while their choices may diﬀer,
there is no ethical basis for redistributive taxation.
Our results may be obvious to some, and surprising to others. At least
they are surprising to those who believe that taking into account work pref-
erences in the population we have an argument for a less redistributive
tax/beneﬁt system. Given our speciﬁcations numerical results suggest that
this is not necessarily so. Note also that a higher correlation between t
and s lowers marginal tax rates uniformly. Or put it another way marginal
tax rates are higher when there is positive (negative) correlation between
work(leisure)preferences and productivity. From Figures 2 and 3 we can also
see that the marginal tax rates are increasing around average z.
What might be an intuitive explanation of these results?14 We know from
the numerical results in KanburTuomala (1994) that a greater inherent in
equality leads to the higher marginal tax rates at each income level in the
one dimensional income tax model. We might reasonable expect in the two-
dimensional world that there is a greater dispersion of income. At least it
seems to us that this is so when there is a positive correlation between work
preferences and productivity. In conjunction with the maximization of the
concave social welfare in the economy with a greater dispersion of income
14It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd intuition because several factors are going on at the same time.
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will imply to higher marginal tax rates.15
Table 1 also shows that the levels of z and x are considerably higher
with heterogenous work preferences than with identical preferences. In other
words the economy with heterogenous work preferences seems to be richer
than that of identical work preferences. How to explain this? For that it
may useful to consider how things are in a no-tax economy in which diversity
of work preferences is the sole source of inequality. Thus people face equal
opportunities in the labour market. To simplify further this economy consists
of two types of individuals who diﬀer in their work preferences s1 and s2,
where s2 > s1. Given the utility function (17) in a no tax economy the
demand for leisure is (1 − y) = s/(1 + s). If we now increase dispersion of
s in this economy, the average leisure decreases. Or put it another way the
average labour supply increases and consequently the average gross income
increases so that the economy becomes richer.
One has to be careful in making comparisons between the one- and two
dimensional problem. It is simply so that we have diﬀerent populations in
diﬀerent cases. Therefore we should not take literally our comparisons in the
Table 1 and Figures 2, 3. They just show the solutions in the two dimensional
and the case, when t = 1.
Moreover, one interesting thing of numerical results is that there were
quite little bunching. In the circumstances under which bunching occurs
each individual faces the same pre-tax income and consumption. This means
that ∂z(t, s)/∂t = ∂z(t, s)/∂s=0 in a subdomain of Ω. In two-dimensional
problems one might expect more bunching simply because some taxpayers
with diﬀerent work preferences will end up to supply the same amount of
labour. In the case of Figure 1 (uniform distribution) the amount of bunch-
ing was about 2 percent. For example in Figure 2 (ρ = -0.3) the amount of
bunching was about 3 percent. In the one-dimensional case the amount of
bunching turns out to be practically speaking zero.
15The referee has encouraged us to take this view.
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Figure 1: Optimal marginal income tax rates and tax schedule
(t, s)(2); t(◦) uniformly distributed (s=1) and s(∆) uniformly distributed
(t=1).
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Figure 2: Optimal marginal income tax rates and tax schedules
(t, s) and t lognormally distributed
2 (µt=µs=-1, σt=σs=0.5, ρ=-0.3)
◦ (µt=µs=-1, σt=σs=0.5, ρ= 0.3)
 (µt=-1, σt=0.5)
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Figure 3: Optimal marginal income tax rates and tax schedules.
(t, s) and t lognormally distributed
2 (µt=µs=-1, σt=σs=0.5, ρ=-0.3)
◦ (µt=µs=-1.2, σt=0.5, σs=0.3, ρ=-0.3)
 (µt=-1, σt=0.5)
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Table 1
Case 1 (Figure 1) ((t, s) uniformly distributed)
Average z and x 0.29
Marginal tax rate at average z 39 %
The maximun value of social welfare -1.53
Case 2 (Figure 2) (µt=µs=-1, σt= σs=0.5, ρ=-0.3 and 0.3)
Average z and x 0.26
Marginal tax rate at average z 32 % (ρ=0.3), 38 % (ρ=-0.3)
Average tax rate at z=1.2 20 % (ρ=0.3), 30 % (ρ=-1.3)
The maximum value of social welfare -1.74 (ρ=0.3), -1.71 (ρ=-0.3)
Case 3 (Figure 3) (µt=-1, µs=-1.2, σt=0.5, σs=0.3, ρ=-0.3)
Average z and x 0.28
Marginal tax rate at average z 38 % and 37 %
Average tax rate at z=1.2 26 %
The maximum value of social welfare -1.62
One-dimensional population (cases 2 and 3)
Average z and x 0.18
Marginal tax rate at average z 28 %
Average tax rate at z=1.2 16 %
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the utilitarian case for a redistributive nonlinear
income tax under the assumption that individual diﬀer in their work prefer-
ences and abilities. A numerical method for solving this problem has been
developed. The problem is diﬃcult to solve, but we managed to solve some
examples. The numerical results obtained give us a direction to inﬂuences
that richer picture of population would have on the optimal income tax sched-
ule. On the basis of our numerical results we conclude that the tax system
is more redistributive compared to those obtained from the one-dimensional
case. This may be surprising to those who believe that taking into account
diﬀerent work preferences is an argument for having less redistribution and
hence lower levels of income taxation and social security payments.
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Appendix: Computational procedure
Instead of trying to approximate the tax function T (z) over the entire inter-
val by one polynomial of high degree, we partition the interval into smaller
intervals and approximate the tax function on each of these smaller intervals
by a low degree polynomial. We approximate the tax function T using a
quadratic (second order) B-spline basis.16 B-splines have small support, i.e.,
they are zero on a large set. For computational convenience it is desirable
to have basis functions with this property. Let [z0, zn] be a ﬁnite interval,
and let z0 < z1 < · · · < zn−1 < zn be the partition points (nodes) for this
interval. Moreover, we introduce additional nodes z−2, z−1, zn+1 and zn+2
such that z−2 < z−1 < z0 and zn < zn+1 < zn+2. Now we write the tax
function T as a sum of basis functions with real parameters {ki, i = 1, ..., N}
as
T h(z) =
N∑
i=1
kiΦi(z) for all z ∈ [z0, zn] (18)
where Φi is a second order B-spline function with support [zi−3, zi] and N =
n+2. Second order B-spline basis implies C1 continuity for the tax function.
Now the tax function T h is uniquely determined byN -dimensional parameter
vector k = [k1, k2, · · · , kN ]′. Thus we denote z(k) as the solution of the state
problem (S) corresponding to parameter vector k.
The discretized problem corresponding to (P) is (Ph):
Find k∗ ∈ RN such that
W (k∗) = max
k
{W (k) =
∫ ∫
Ω
[g(z(k)− T h(z(k))) + s h(z(k)/t)] f(t, s) dt ds}
(19)
subject to
G(k) =
∫ ∫
Ω
T h(z(k)) f(t, s) dt ds = R. (20)
The discretized problem (Ph) can be regarded as a constrained nonsmooth
optimization problem and hence the problem can be solved e.g. by Brox-
imal Bundle method. We apply the code MPBNGC from a sub-routine lib-
rary NSOLIB to solve the nonsmooth optimization problem (19)(20) (see
Mäkelä, 1990 and 1993).
When solving the nonsmooth optimization problem (Ph) one needs the
(sub)gradient and the function valuesW (k) and G(k) at each iteration point.
The numerical procedure for computation of the values of the social welfare
16Mortenson (1985) provides a detailed exposition on the B-splines.
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function, constraints and the subgradients is ﬁrst to compute values z(k)
at a set of quadrature points (ti, sj), i, j = 1, · · · ,M . At each evaluation of
z(ti, sj ; k) we have to solve the state problem (S). This problem is solved by
NAG-library subroutine E04KBF. The values of the social welfare function,
constraints and their subgradients can be evaluated by the quadrature. The
quadratures are computed by the Romberg integration. The interval [z0, zn]
was partitioned into n= 9 and n= 10 equal subintervals. Thus the number of
unknowns was N = 11 or N = 12. If the number of unknowns was increased
over that the value of the objective function didn't increase signiﬁcantly.
The number of discretization points for t and s variables is 33 (=M).
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